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Notes
The Professional Sports Community Protection Act:
Congress' Best Response to Raiders?
On March 1, 1980, Al Davis made good on a threat. After more
than a year of unsuccessful negotiation on a new lease agreement with
the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Commission, Davis, the manag-
ing general partner of the National Football League's Oakland Raiders,
signed a "memorandum of agreement" with the Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Commission ("Coliseum Commission").1 The memorandum
outlined the terms of the Raiders' relocation to Los Angeles. The NFL
blocked the move, however, invoking a League rule that prohibited a
team from moving to a different city without the approval of three-
fourths of the League's members.2 The Coliseum Commission and the
Raiders responded with an antitrust suit against the NFL, charging that
the League's three-fourths approval rule for franchise relocations vio-
lated section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 The Coliseum Commission and the
Raiders eventually won a jury verdict, and on July 14, 1982, the United
States District Court for the Central District of California permanently
enjoined the NFL from interfering with the Raiders' move.4 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's verdict on February
28, 1984. 5
Although the Raiders case specifically dealt with only the NFL's
franchise relocation restriction, the decision seems to have invalidated
such rules in all professional sports. Since the Raiders' move, three
teams have relocated and others have threatened to do so. Congress, in
response to calls for help from leagues, city officials, and stadium com-
missioners who feel abandoned or "blackmailed" by franchise owners,
1. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984) [hereinafter Raiders].
2. Rule 4.3 of the NFL Constitution stated:
The League shall have exclusive control of the exhibition of football games by mem-
ber clubs within the home territory of each member. No member club shall have the
right to transfer its franchise or playing site to a different city ... without prior
approval by the affirmative vote of three-fourths of the existing member clubs of the
League.
Id. n.1.
3. Id. at 1385; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
4. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1386.
5. Id. at 1381.
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has considered a number of bills that would regulate team relocations or
otherwise protect the cities. However, none of the many bills has passed.
In this Note, I examine congressional response to the now-famous
Raiders decision. By way of background, I review the case and discuss
the franchise shifts and threatened moves that have followed. I then out-
line and examine the reasons federal legislation is appropriate in this area
and briefly review five bills introduced in Congress to regulate team relo-
cations. Finally, I analyze a sixth approach, The Professional Sports
Community Protection Act of 1985, offer suggestions for its improve-
ment, and recommend its passage by Congress.
Raiders: Establishing the Status Quo
Shortly after reaching agreement with the Coliseum Commission,
Davis announced his intention to move south at an NFL meeting on
March 3, 1980. Seven days later, League members voted 22-0, with five
abstentions, against granting permission for the move.6 Davis objected
to the vote, maintaining that NFL Rule 4.3, which required three-fourths
approval from member clubs for any relocation outside a team's home
territory, violated federal antitrust law. The Coliseum Commission then
renewed its earlier suit against the NFL and each of its member clubs, 7
and the Raiders joined as a party plaintiff.8 On July 24, 1981, at the
conclusion of oral arguments in the jury trial, Judge Harry Pregerson 9
granted plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict on the issue of whether
the NFL was a "single business entity" for antitrust analysis purposes. 10
By holding that the NFL was not a single entity, Judge Pregerson, while
not ruling on the merits of the case, nevertheless determined that the
6. Id. at 1385.
7. The Coliseum Commission originally brought suit against the NFL regarding Rule
4.3 in September 1978, shortly after the Los Angeles Rains announced their plans to move
from the Coliseum to Anaheim Stadium beginning in 1980. The district court, however, dis-
missed the complaint for lack of standing with leave to amend. The court found that the
Coliseum Commission had failed to allege either that it was reasonably likely that it would
reach lease terms with an NFL transfer team or that NFL members would not approve such a
move. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 468 F. Supp. 154, 157-62 (C.D. Cal.
1980).
The Coliseum Commission renewed its suit in January 1980, after negotiations with the
Raiders appeared fruitful, and on February 21, 1980 the district court granted a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the NFL from enforcing Rule 4.3. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. NFL, 484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1980). The Ninth Circuit reversed, however,
holding that the district court had abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction
under circumstances in which there was no showing of irreparable injury. Los Angeles Me-
morial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980).
8. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1385.
9. Circuit Judge, sitting by designation in the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California. Id. at 1382.
10. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal.
1981), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
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League was capable of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.11
The first trial ended in a hung jury, and a second trial was held less
than a year later. On May 6, 1982, the court gave instructions on the
antitrust liability issues to the second jury, which returned a verdict in
favor of the Coliseum Commission and the Raiders the next day.12 A
separate damages trial began in September 1982 and resulted in a treble
damage verdict of more than $49 million against the NFL. 13 The League
appealed the liability decision on two grounds: first, that it was a "single
entity" and second, that Rule 4.3 was not an unreasonable restraint on
competition. 14
Writing for the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel, Judge J. Blaine
Anderson affirmed the district court's directed verdict on the issue of
whether the NFL was a "single business entity" for antitrust analysis
purposes. He noted that NFL teams compete with each other for the
11. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). By definition, a "single
business entity" cannot "contract," "combine," or "conspire" in violation of the statute. See,
e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (parent corporation
and wholly owned subsidiary not legally capable of conspiring in violation of § 1).
12. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1386.
13. Id. In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.
1986), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury's $14,580,243 treble damage award to the Coliseum
Commission. However, the court vacated the Raiders' award of $34,663,146 and remanded for
determination of the proper amount of recovery. Since the NFL was entitled to charge a
relocating team for the "expansion value" of the Los Angeles market, and the preliminary
injunction allowing the Raiders' move had not required the team to compensate the League,
the court held that the Raiders' damage award should be offset by the difference between the
Los Angeles "expansion value" and the "expansion value" of the Oakland market that was
created when the Raiders relocated. Id. at 1375.
14. In granting a directed verdict on the "single business entity" issue, the district court
stated that "[t]he question is a close one." 519 F. Supp. at 582. The court acknowledged that
member teams cooperated to produce a unitary product-NFL football-but rejected the
League's theory for three reasons. First, antitrust challenges against the NFL had been previ-
ously upheld by the courts. Id. at 583; see North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249
(2d Cir. 1982) (NFL rule prohibiting cross-ownership of teams in other sports held a violation
of the Sherman Act); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (NFL col-
lege player draft held "anticompetitive" and violative of the Sherman Act). Second, "organi-
zations whose product is just as unitary as the NFL's and requires the same kind of
cooperation from the organization's members, have been found to violate section 1 of the Sher-
man Act." 519 F. Supp. at 583; see Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963)
(Exchange violated § I by removing direct telephone connections between Exchange members
and two over-the-counter broker-dealers); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)
(newsgathering association's bylaws aimed at preventing competitors of existing members from
joining held unlawful). Finally, the court rejected the NFL's "false premise ... that the indi-
vidual NFL clubs are not separate business entities whose products have an independent
value." 519 F. Supp. at 584. The court noted that a number of the League's teams- includ-
ing the Raiders-had once been members of the rival American Football League and that
conceivably an NFL team could withdraw and join a new league. Id.
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services of players, coaches, and management personnel, and although
approximately ninety percent of League revenues are shared, profits and
losses are not. 15 "Our inquiry discloses an association of teams suffi-
ciently independent and competitive with one another to warrant...
scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act." 16
After determining that the NFL could violate the Sherman Act, the
majority affirmed the jury verdict that the application of Rule 4.3 did
indeed constitute such a violation. 17 Section 1 of the Sherman Act de-
clares that every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade is illegal. 18 Because all contractual relationships involve some type
of restraint, however, the Supreme Court held early on that section 1
only prohibits agreements unreasonably restraining trade. 19 This "rule of
reason" analysis involves an examination of "a variety of market factors
such as the nature of the restraint and its effect, market conditions, and
the history of the restraint.
'20
Although the reasonableness of an agreement is always technically
at issue in a section 1 case, the Supreme Court has determined that a
shortcut analysis, or "per se treatment," is applicable in some cases. The
15. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1390.
16. Id. at 1389. Dissenting in part, District Judge Spencer M. Williams, sitting by
designation, insisted that the NFL should be considered a "single business entity" with respect
to Rule 4.3. Id. at 1401 (Williams, J., concurring and dissenting). He emphasized the revenue
sharing and cooperation between League members that the majority had not considered con-
trolling: "'Single entity' taken in a functional sense begins and ends with an analysis of formal
organizational and operational aspects of the enterprise, reconciled with the realities of the
economic competition in the marketplace." Id. at 1403. Judge Williams differentiated agree-
ments regulating the "upstream flow" of goods and services used by NFL teams to produce
professional football-players and coaches, for example-from intraleague agreements regu-
lating the "downstream output" of NFL football. 1d. at 1406-10. While the former should be
governed by traditional antitrust analysis, Judge Williams stated that the latter-including
Rule 4.3-should not: "The NFL cannot truly be separated from its member clubs, which are
simultaneously franchisees and franchisors. The Raiders did not, and do not now, seek to
compete with the other clubs in any sense other than in their win/loss standings." Id. at 1404.
17. Id. at 1401.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
19. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
20. ANTITRUST ADVISER § 1.05 (C. Hills 3d ed. 1985). In Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), Justice Brandeis articulated the approach used in rule
of reason analysis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine .that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condi-
tion before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained,
are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation, or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
[Vol. 38
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Court has used the per se analysis in such categories as price fixing, com-
petitor market division, certain group boycotts, and certain tying ar-
rangements. "[B]ecause of their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue [such actions] are conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."
'21
In United States v. Topco Associates,22 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the per se treatment of territorial market division agreements by competi-
tors. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit panel in Raiders held that Rule 4.3,
which clearly divides markets, was to be analyzed under the rule of rea-
son. The court emphasized the NFL's unique structure:
In a quite general sense, the case presents the competing consider-
ations of whether a group of businessmen can enforce an agreement
with one of their co-contractors to the detriment of that co-contrac-
tor's right to do business where he pleases. More specifically, this law-
suit requires us to engage in the difficult task of analyzing the negative
and positive effects of a business practice in an industry which does not
readily fit into the antitrust context. Section 1 of the Sherman Act was
designed to prevent agreements among competitors which eliminate or
reduce competition and thereby harm consumers. Yet, as we discussed
in the context of the single entity issue, the NFL teams are not true
competitors, nor can they be.
23
The court noted that the League's structure had both horizontal and
vertical attributes. Although the NFL could be seen as merely a group
of twenty-eight competitors, it could also be regarded as an entity sepa-
rate from the team owners. The Raiders court therefore held Topco inap-
plicable and instead applied the rule of reason analysis:
On its face, Rule 4.3 divides markets among the 28 teams, a practice
presumed illegal, but, as we have noted, the unique structure of the
NFL precludes application of the per se rule. Instead, we must ex-
amine Rule 4.3 to determine whether it reasonably serves the legiti-
mate collective concerns of the owners or instead permits them to reap
excessive profits at the expense of the consuming public. 2
4
The court found a number of clear competitive harms in Rule 4.3.
Granting exclusive territories to NFL teams gives the teams monopoly
power in their respective markets. As applied in this case, Rule 4.3 effec-
tively precluded the Coliseum Commission from acquiring an NFL ten-
ant and prevented the Raiders from competing with the Los Angeles
Rams in southern California. "If the transfer is upheld, direct competi-
tion between the Rams and Raiders would presumably ensue to the bene-
fit of all who consume the NFL product in the Los Angeles area."'25
21. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (citation omitted).
22. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
23. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1390-91.
24. Id. at 1392 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 1395.
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The NFL contended that it should be granted judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. The League maintained that territorial allocations
were inherent in the structure of professional sports leagues and that
Rule 4.3 aided the NFL as a whole and promoted competition among its
teams. For example, the NFL claimed that exclusive territories aid new
franchises in achieving financial stability, foster fan loyalty, and make the
League more appealing to television networks by maintaining regional
balance and coverage of major and minor markets. The NFL added that
it had a legitimate interest in regulating transfers to prevent unwise
moves and to protect the local governments and taxpayers that had made
large financial commitments to construct stadiums. Although the court
of appeals agreed that "the nature of NFL football requires some territo-
rial restrictions," it refused to agree that the jury should have concluded
that the League's franchise relocation rule was reasonable.2
6
The court pointed out that the jury was properly instructed to con-
sider, as part of its overall determination of reasonableness, whether the
NFL could have resorted to less restrictive means to achieve its ex-
pressed objectives. In support of the jury verdict, the court outlined a
few areas in which Rule 4.3 might have been considered broader than
necessary. First, while the rule may prevent unwise franchise shifts,
neither standards, durational limitations, fan loyalties, nor team rivalries
were incorporated into the voting process. 27 In fact, under the three-
fourths approval requirement, an owner concerned only with preserving
his territorial monopoly need gather just "seven friendly votes" to block
a move, regardless of the size and potential of the market.28 Second, in
response to the NFL's professed concern for cities, the court stated that
local governments could protect themselves through the leases they nego-
tiate with teams. Finally, the NFL presented no evidence that the Raid-
ers' move would harm the League, either in scheduling, television
revenue, financial stability, or regional balance.
29
The court suggested that team movement restrictions would fare
better against antitrust attack if, instead of being limited to a simple sub-
jective voting procedure, they expressly recognized objective criteria such
as regional balance, market population, facilities, economic projections,
location continuity, and fan loyalty.30 In conclusion, Judge Anderson
admitted that the NFL's unique organization had made antitrust analysis
difficult. Nevertheless, he believed that the trial court and jury had ade-
quate evidence to determine that the NFL had violated the Sherman Act
by preventing the Raiders' move. "We believe antitrust principles are
26. Id. at 1398.
27. Id. at 1396.
28. Id. at 1397.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see Kurlantzick, Thoughts on Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 15
CONN. L. REV. 183, 206-08 (1983).
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sufficiently flexible to account for the NFL's structure. To the extent the
NFL finds the law inadequate, it must look to Congress for help.''31
Relocation Fallout from Raiders
Although Raiders specifically invalidated only the NFL's three-
fourths approval rule as it had been applied to the Raiders' move to Los
Angeles, the decision has served to place the legality of any franchise
relocation restriction by any professional sports league in doubt. Since
the trial court decision holding NFL Rule 4.3 illegal in June 1982, four
teams in three leagues have either moved or attempted to move, and
three other NFL teams have threatened to do so.
In early 1983, the Ralston Purina Company, owner of the National
Hockey League's St. Louis Blues, announced its intention to sell the team
to a group that would move it to Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. 32 NHL Pres-
ident John A. Ziegler, Jr., testified that League members were faced with
a Hobson's choice: they could either avoid potential antitrust liability by
approving a move they felt was improper, or they could risk a suit by
enforcing the League constitution prohibiting franchise shifts without
unanimous team approval.33 The League chose the latter course by dis-
approving the move and finding other buyers that would keep the team
in St. Louis. 34 In response, Ralston Purina filed a $60 million antitrust
suit 35 that was reportedly settled out of court in June 1985.36
Two National Basketball Association franchises have relocated
since the Ninth Circuit's Raiders decision. On May 15, 1984, the San
Diego Clippers announced that they had signed a long-term lease with
the Los Angeles Memorial Sports Arena. Citing Raiders, the team made
the move without requesting an NBA vote, and they began play in Los
Angeles during the 1984-85 season. 37 A year later, the Kansas City
Kings, a team which had drawn an average of fewer than 6500 fans per
game during the 1984-85 season, was granted unanimous NBA approval
to move to Sacramento. 38 NBA Commissioner David J. Stern later testi-
31. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1401.
32. Professional Sports Community Protection Act of1985. Hearings on S. 259 and S. 287
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 84
(1985) (statement of John A. Ziegler, Jr., President, NHL) [hereinafter Hearings].
33. Id. at 82.
34. Id. at 84.
35. Ralston Purina Co. v. National Hockey League, No. 83-1264-c(3) (E.D. Mo. filed
May 24, 1983).
36. Los Angeles Times, June 28, 1985, pt. III, at 12, col. 1. The terms of the settlement
were not disclosed.
37. Clippers Make Move to L.A. Sports Arena and Say It's Official, Los Angeles Times,
May 16, 1984, pt. III, at 1, col. 1. Clippers' President Alan Rothenberg was quoted as saying,
"NBA approval is not legally necessary .... The Raiders case has made a difference." Id.
38. NBA Kings Officially Receiye Approval for Shift of Franchise to Sacramento, Los An-
geles Times, Apr. 17, 1985, pt. III, at 8, col. 2.
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fled before a congressional committee that the Kansas City situation il-
lustrated the "straitjacket" in which the Raiders decision had placed
professional sports leagues, because league action in approving or re-
jecting any prospective franchise shift might constitute an antitrust
violation.3
9
In the NFL, the Raiders decision and its accompanying $49 million
treble damage award led the League to decide against interfering with the
Baltimore Colts' relocation in early 1984.40 After playing in Baltimore
for thirty-one years, the Colts moved to Indianapolis on March 29, 1984,
after the Indiana city reportedly "outbid" officials in Phoenix, Arizona.
4'
Phoenix' interest in acquiring the Philadelphia Eagles later in the year
prompted the NFL to reconsider its short-lived inactive position.
Although the Eagles did not consult the League regarding its intent to
move, the NFL reaffirmed its right to regulate franchise shifts by filing
suit against the team.42 The Eagles ultimately decided to remain in Phil-
adelphia, but reportedly only after city officials agreed to help promote
the team, make improvements at Veterans Stadium, defer the Eagles'
rent for ten years, provide additional security at games, and build the
team a new practice field.
43
This form of "legal blackmail" also surfaced in the threatened
moves of the NFL's St. Louis Cardinals and New Orleans Saints in 1985.
Officials of both teams stated that, because of the Raiders decision, they
were not bound by League relocation rules.44 The Cardinals' owner,
William Bidwell, reportedly entertained bids in January 1985 from cities
interested in acquiring the team, 45 but he ended speculation about a
move to Phoenix three months later after St. Louis officials announced a
proposal to build a $100 million domed stadium.46 In New Orleans, new
39. Hearings, supra note 32, at 77 (testimony of David J. Stem, Commissioner, NBA);
see S. Rap. No. 69, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985).
40. NFL Will Not Try to Block the Colts, Los Angeles Times, Mar. 3, 1984, pt. III, at 16,
col. 1.
41. Colts Go to Indianapolis in Middle of the Night, Los Angeles Times, Mar. 30, 1984,
pt. III, at 10, col. 1. Indianapolis reportedly offered Colts' Owner Robert Irsay a $15 million
loan at eight percent interest, a long-term agreement at "modest" rent to play at the new
61,000-seat Hoosier Dome, and a guaranteed-attendance clause. The Phoenix offer reportedly
would have given the Colts a $15 million low-interest loan, free use of Sun Devil Stadium, and
a guaranteed $3 million in ticket sales. Id.
42. Hearings, supra note 32, at 61 (statement of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, NFL).
43. Agreement Made to Keep Eagles in Philadelphia, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 16, 1984,
pt. III, at 1, col. 1.
44. Hearings, supra note 32, at 61-62 (statement of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, NFL).
45. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 7, 1985, pt. III, at 5, col. 3.
46. Id., Apr. 6, 1985, pt. III, at 7, col. 2. The Cardinals currently play in Busch Stadium,
the second-smallest facility in the NFL (capacity 51,391), and their 1984 average game attend-
ance of 46,513 was nearly 13,000 below the League average. In addition, the team's thirty-year
lease does not include any parking or concessions revenue. Id., Jan. 17, 1985, pt. III, at 14,
col. 4.
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owner Tom Benson signed a twenty-one year agreement not to move the
Saints after the State of Louisiana reportedly agreed to a state sales tax
exemption on tickets and parking and gave the team $2.5 million in con-
cessions on Superdome revenues. 47
Rumors of franchise shifts by Major League Baseball teams in San
Francisco, Pittsburgh, and Seattle also occurred in 1985. Major League
Baseball is exempt from the antitrust laws48 and, according to Commis-
sioner Peter Ueberroth, has "a longstanding policy of retaining teams in
47. Id., May 24, 1985, pt. III, at 4, col. 1.
48. Major League Baseball has enjoyed a judicially granted antitrust exemption for more
than 60 years. This exemption resulted from a suit brought in 1920 under the Sherman Act by
the Baltimore franchise of the short-lived Federal League of Baseball Clubs. National League
v. Federal Baseball Club, 269 F. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
The eight-team Federal League was founded in 1913 as a rival to the established National
and American Leagues. Two years later, the Federal League was disbanded as part of a
"Peace Agreement" with the other two leagues. Id. at 682. The Baltimore franchise refused to
take part in the agreement and filed suit to challenge both the agreement and the system of
"reserving" players under contract used by the National and American Leagues. Id. Under
the "reserve clause" of the standard major league contract, a team had the right to retain the
services for the season following the season during which the contract was effective. See L.
SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW 83-96 (1977). The reserve clause served to
bind every player to his club indefinitely, because the clause was renewed simply by renewing
the contract for the succeeding season. Id. at 91.
In Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), the Supreme Court
held that the questions regarding anticompetitive behavior presented by the Baltimore
franchise's suit need not be answered. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes con-
cluded that professional baseball was a game, not interstate commerce, and therefore was not
subject to the antitrust laws:
The business is giving exhibitions of baseball, which are purely state affairs....
But the fact that, in order to give the exhibitions, the Leagues must induce free per-
sons to cross state lines, and must arrange and pay for their doing so, is not enough
to change the character of the business.... [Tihe transport is a mere incident, not the
essential thing. That to which it is incident, the exhibition, although made for
money, would not be caled trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of
these words.
Id. at 208-09.
This result was rather summarily reaffirmed 31 years later in Toolson v. New York
Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam). Toolson involved a Yankees player who was as-
signed to the minor leagues. Toolson refused to report and filed suit to challenge the reserve
clause in his contract, which prevented him from negotiating with other major league teams.
In a one-paragraph per curiam opinion, the Court stated that Congress' inaction constituted
acquiescence in Federal Baseball Club: "[I]f there are evils in this field which now warrant
application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation." Id. at 357.
The Court upheld baseball's antitrust exemption a third time in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258 (1972). The St. Louis Cardinals traded Curt Flood, an all-star outfielder, to the Philadel-
phia Phillies in 1969. Flood refused to report and asked Major League Baseball Commissioner
Bowie Kuhn to declare him a free agent. When Kuhn refused, Flood brought suit to challenge
the reserve clause. Writing for a 5-3 majority, Justice Blackmun admitted that, contrary to
Federal Baseball Club, professional baseball is a business that is engaged in interstate com-
merce. Id. at 282. However, even though the exemption might be regarded "as 'unrealistic,
inconsistent, or illogical,' the aberration is an established one ... that has been with us now for
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their home area where at all possible." 49
The Need for Federal Legislation
In concluding its Raiders opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals stated that, although the NFL's structure did not fit neatly into
traditional antitrust analysis, it fit nevertheless. Judge Anderson left the
League an alternative: "To the extent the NFL finds the law inadequate,
it must look to Congress for relief."' 50 The NFL, other sports leagues,
and local governments have done just that by requesting federal regula-
tion of franchise relocations. By so doing, the parties have expressed
their belief that the free market should not govern the location of sports
teams.
Convincing reasons support this belief. First, in many cases local
governments have invested huge sums of public capital to construct sta-
diums. A team owner's unilateral right to withdraw from a city would
make such an investment very risky. For example, the Oakland-Ala-
meda County Coliseum was built specifically for the Raiders in 1965.
When the team left for Los Angeles in 1982, the city and county were left
with an annual debt service of $1.5 million through the year 2006.51
Although the Raiders court stated that "local governments ought to be
able to protect their investment through the leases they negotiate," 52 the
need for extended debt terms may make this solution impossible.
Second, sports franchises provide direct revenue to municipalities
through stadium rent and taxes, as well as such indirect benefits as em-
ployment, tourism, and local economic development. In some cases, the
figures are staggering. The Raiders' presence in Oakland has been esti-
mated to have generated more than $75 million annually to the area's
half a century, one heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that
has survived the Court's expanding concept of interstate commerce." Id. (citation omitted).
Ironically, after surviving three Supreme Court challenges, the reserve system was abol-
ished in 1975 by an arbitrator's decision under the grievance procedure of baseball's collective
bargaining agreement. Arbitrator Peter Seitz ruled that pitchers Andy Messersmith and Dave
McNally, who both played the 1975 season without signing contracts, could be reserved by
their respective teams for only one year. Messersmith Ruling Imperils the Reserve Clause, Los
Angeles Times, Dec. 24, 1975, pt. III, at 1, col. 1. Seitz' decision began the "free agent" era in
Major League Baseball. The courts upheld the arbitration award over the team owners' argu-
ment that questions regarding the reserve clause were not within the scope of the grievance
procedure. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 409 F.
Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
49. Hearings, supra note 32, at 55 (statement of Peter Ueberroth, Commissioner, Major
League Baseball).
50. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1401.
51. Hearings, supra note 32, at 156 (statement of George VuKasin, President, Oakland-
Alameda County Coliseum Commission); S. REP. No. 69, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985).
52. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1397.
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economy, 53 and Baltimore's loss of the Colts has been valued at $35 mil-
lion per year to the State of Maryland.5 4 The Mayor of St. Louis stated
that a departure of the Cardinals football team would result in a loss of
1100 jobs and a total direct and indirect economic loss to the city of
$33.6 million.
55
Third, the economic and competitive stability of sports leagues de-
pends in part on the stability of individual franchises. Accordingly, an
unwise relocation could be harmful both to the team and to the league.
The Raiders court acknowledged the importance of preventing such un-
wise moves, but pointed out that the NFL had not actually provided any
objective means of considering the issue in the approval process.
56
Finally, intangible factors favor federal legislation to regulate team
relocations. Sports franchises provide a special source of civic pride and
recognition, and fan loyalty and support therefore should be considered
in any decision. When the Raiders left Oakland, for example, they had
the third-highest revenues in the NFL, had sold out 121 consecutive
games in twelve years, and had more than 5000 fans on a season ticket
waiting list.5 7 Missouri Senator John C. Danforth summarized this spe-
cial feeling toward sports teams:
Normally, Congress would not concern itself with the movement
of one business-a factory, for example-from one community to a
second community, but a sports team is different from the normal busi-
ness. A sports team is closely identified with the community itself. A
sports team carries with it the support of the community, the identity
of the community, and the spirit of the community.
58
Some federal proposals would grant professional sports leagues a
limited antitrust exemption for relocation requests, thus expressly over-
ruling the Raiders decision.59 Although piecemeal exemptions are con-
trary to the spirit of the Sherman Act, Congress has previously
recognized that the unique nature of sports leagues justified limited ex-
emptions. 60 Any further action would come only after lengthy debate
53. Hearings, supra note 32, at 156 (testimony of George VuKasin, President, Oakland-
Alameda County Coliseum Commission).
54. Id. at 126 (testimony of Harry Hughes, Governor of Maryland).
55. Id. at 171 (letter by Vincent C. Schoemehl, Jr., Mayor of St. Louis).
56. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1396.
57. Hearings, supra note 32, at 156 (testimony of George VuKasin, President, Oakland-
Alameda County Coliseum Commission).
58. Ird. at 1 (opening statement of Sen. Danforth, Chair, U.S. Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation).
59. See, eg., S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S682 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985);
S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 8282 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985); S. 259, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (antitrust exemption granted in 1961 to allow sports leagues
to pool television rights; amended in 1966 to allow the National and American Football
Leagues to merge).
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over a number of proposals. There is also concern that such legislation
would "lock-in" teams to particular locations, thus preventing other de-
serving cities from acquiring franchises. One proposed bill would solve
this problem by requiring expansion in Major League Baseball and the
NFL,61 while other legislative proposals are based on the theories that
such a requirement would involve too much direct governmental intru-
sion into sports and that internal league stability would breed voluntary
expansion.
62
It is of course arguable that the success of the Raiders, Colts, Clip-
pers, and Kings in their new homes63 supports a team owner's right to
exercise his independent business judgment in determining where to lo-
cate the team. As stated earlier, however, one ill-advised move could
affect the entire league.64 Moreover, the rationale underlying relocation
restrictions encompasses the protection of the communities that have
built stadiums and supported teams, as well as the teams and leagues
themselves. Finally, opponents of federal legislation could contend that
antitrust exemption is unnecessary because leagues could develop reloca-
tion regulations that would pass "rule of reason" scrutiny. Although the
courts evaluating NFL Rule 4.3 have stated that a majority vote require-
ment 65 or a process evaluating objective criteria66 would be less objec-
tionable than Rule 4.3's three-fourths approval requirement, such dicta
do not legally sanction particular conduct. The penalty for an unsuccess-
ful attempt to formulate reasonable rules could be a treble damage
award.
61. A proposal by Sen. Slade Gorton would require Major League Baseball to add two
teams by 1988 and the NFL to add four, including teams in Baltimore and Oakland, by 1990.
S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(a), 131 CONG. REC. S665, S668 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
62. E.g., S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(4) (1985) (congressional finding of public inter-
est in the expansion of sports leagues by promoting team stability).
63. The Raiders set a team record during the 1984 season with an average home attend-
ance of 64,065, fifth highest in the NFL. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE RECORD & FACr
BOOK 53 (1985 ed.). The Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum seats approximately 93,000 for
football, nearly 40,000 more than the Raiders' former stadium in Oakland.
The Colts also set a team attendance record in 1984-their first year in Indianapolis-
with an average home crowd of 60,163, seventh highest in the League. Id. at 45. During the
previous season in Baltimore, the team averaged an NFL low of 37,441 at home. Id. at 43
(1984 ed.).
Both NBA transfer teams improved at the gate in their first seasons in new cities. The
Clippers' home attendance increased nearly 68%, to 9369 per game, during the 1984-85 season
in Los Angeles. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION GUIDE 214 (1985-86 ed.). The
Kings, which in 1984-85 ranked last among 23 NBA teams with an average attendance of 6410
in Kansas City's 16,778-seat Kemper Arena, id., sold out all of their 41 home games at Arco
Arena, a temporary 10,333-seat home in Sacramento. Id. at 220 (1986-87 ed.).
64. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
65. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 484 F. Supp. 1274, 1277
(C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980).




With the refusal of most sports leagues to risk antitrust liability, the
answer to the relocation problem has been left to Congress. It thus far
has failed to respond. Since the Raiders' move, a number of United
States Senators and Representatives, inspired perhaps by franchise shifts
or threats involving their home states, 67 have proposed bills that would
limit the movement of sports franchises from one city to another. None
of these bills has passed, however. In the next sections, I will briefly
analyze five bills introduced in Congress since late 1983 and then more
closely evaluate a sixth: the Professional Sports Community Protection
Act of 1985.68
Major League Baseball Community Protection Act
Minnesota Senator Rudy Boschwitz introduced the Major League
Baseball Community Protection Act on November 3, 1983.69 The bill
would apply only to Major League Baseball teams being offered for sale.
Under its terms, a current team owner would be required to give the
appropriate government authorities six months' notice before accepting
an offer that would result in the team's relocation.
Such notice would lead to the creation of a three-person arbitration
board within thirty days. The board would be comprised of one member
chosen by the team owner, another chosen by the governmental author-
ity, and another chosen by the first two members. Any person interested
in buying-but not relocating-the team could submit an offer to the
board within four months of its creation. Formal hearings on all offers,
including the offer to relocate, would be held after six months. If the
board determined that any of the submitted offers equaled or exceeded
the value of the original offer, the owner would be prohibited from selling
the team without a written commitment from the purchaser to keep it in
the metropolitan area. The owner would have discretion in choosing to
whom to sell the team, as long as the buyer agreed not to relocate. The
government authority could enforce the bill's provisions through a civil
67. This Note analyzes bills sponsored by Sen. Boschwitz (Minnesota), Sen. Specter
(Pennsylvania), Rep. Dellums (California), Sen. DeConcini (Arizona), Sen. Gorton (Washing-
ton), and Sens. Eagleton and Danforth (Missouri). Each of the states represented by these
Congressmen has either lost a franchise to relocation, been threatened with a move, or been the
proposed new home of a team.
68. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sss. (1985).
69. S. 2050, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S15,383 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1983).
Senator Boschwitz said that he was motivated to introduce the bill because of offers made
earlier in the year to purchase the Minnesota Twins baseball team and move it to the Tampa/
St. Petersburg area. The Twins had recently moved into the Hubert H. Humphrey Me-
trodome, a $55 million stadium built in Minneapolis with public funds. 129 CONG. REc.
S15,383-84 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1983) (statement of Sen. Boschwitz).
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suit for damages or equitable relief filed in a federal court.70
Even if the bill were applicable to all professional sports, 71 it would
not be the answer to the franchise relocation problem. The bill applies
only to team sales, and "does not protect against relocation of the team
under the current ownership. '72 Therefore, an owner could easily cir-
cumvent the bill's provisions by relocating the team first and then selling
it upon arriving at the new location. Senator Boschwitz admits that ad-
ditional legislation would probably be necessary.
7 3
The arbitration board concept also appears undesirable. It does not
involve the affected league in the selection of a purchaser, and the guide-
lines for the board's operation are unclear. The bill requires the board to
determine the "value" of purchase offers, yet fails to explain how value is
to be determined. Valuation could be a difficult task in light of the large
amounts of money likely to be involved in a sports franchise sale. Fi-
nally, a team owner has no right to appeal a board decision; such deter-
minations are final and binding.74
The Major League Baseball Community Protection Act thus seems
flawed in a number of crucial areas. It is limited in its coverage and
provides a gaping loophole through which baseball owners could move
their teams without regulation or approval. The bill neither allows for
sufficient league involvement nor provides adequate procedural safe-
guards for the team owner.
Professional Football Stabilization Act of 1985
Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter introduced the Professional
Football Stabilization Act of 1985 on January 3, 1985.7 5 Under section 4
of his proposal, it would be unlawful for a professional football team to
move from a municipality in which it had been located for the past six
years unless: 1) another party to the stadium lease agreement materially
breaches a provision "essential to profitability, and such noncompliance
cannot be remedied within a reasonable period of time"; or 2) the team's
present stadium is "inadequate for the purposes of profitably operating
the team" and the stadium authority refuses to make improvements; or
70. S. 2050, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4-8, 129 CONG. REc. S15,383-84 (daily ed. Nov. 3,
1983).
71. The bill would retain baseball's antitrust exemption only for franchises that agree in
writing to be bound by the arbitration procedures. Id. § 8, 129 CoNG. REc. S15,384; see supra
note 48.
72. 129 CONG. REc. S15,383-84 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1983) (statement of Sen. Boschwitz).
73. Id.
74. S. 2050, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 6(e), 129 CONG. REc. S15,383-84 (daily ed. Nov. 3,
1983).
75. S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. RFc. S282 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985). Sen.
Specter stated that his bill would address the recent threatened move of the NFL's Philadel-
phia Eagles to Phoenix. Id. (statement of Sen. Specter).
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3) the team has suffered net losses for three consecutive years or "has
incurred losses in a shorter period that endanger the continued profitabil-
ity of the team."
'76
The bill requires that the team wishing to relocate give 120 days'
written notice to the local "government authority." 77 If the government
authority concludes that the criteria in section 4 have not been met, it
may bring a suit in a federal court to prevent the relocation and for other
equitable relief and damages.78 If the criteria have been met, the team
will be permitted to relocate. However, if the team is also up for sale, the
bill gives the municipality a right of first refusal by authorizing the gov-
ernment authority or its designate to prevent relocation by making a "re-
tention offer [that] substantially equals the relocation offer."
79
This bill, like that of Senator Boschwitz, 80 provides a loophole that
would allow a current owner to avoid the right of first refusal provision
by moving the team before selling it. Additionally, it gives no guidance in
determining what constitutes a "substantially equal" offer, or even who is
to make that determination. A more fundamental problem lies in the
bill's criteria for allowing a move. The three per se criteria are insuffi-
cient to encompass the many factors that should be involved in a reloca-
tion decision,81 and they are stated in dangerously vague terms. These
binding yet unclear requirements could result in a rash of litigation over
their meaning, thereby further delaying and complicating the already un-
stable relocation issue.
The bill also does little to promote league self-determination. Sena-
tor Specter stated that his proposal provides "limited antitrust immu-
nity,' ' 82 but the bill only exempts league decisions restricting movement
according to the criteria in section 483-movement that the bill already
declares unlawful. The Professional Football Stabilization Act features
many of the inadequacies found in Senator Boschwitz' bill. The bill reg-
ulates only one sport, and that sport is regulated in a somewhat arbitrary
manner by an interested governmental entity without league par-
ticipation.
76. S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 131 CONG. REc. S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985). In
computing a team's net losses, "no personal obligations or losses of the owner may be included
in salaries, other compensation or expenses to owners or owners' family members except to the
extent they are ordinary, reasonable and necessary compensation and expenses." Id. § 4(3).
77. Id.
78. Id.§6.
79. Id. § 4(3).
80. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
81. Cf. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(b), 131 CONG. REc. S665-66 (daily ed. Jan. 24,
1985) (nine factors to be considered in determining whether relocation is proper); S. 259, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1985) (12 factors to be considered). In both bills, none of the enumerated
factors is dispositive.
82. 131 CONG. REc. S282 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (statement of Sen. Specter).
83. S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, 131 CONG. Rc. S282, S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985).
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Professional Sports Franchise Relocation Act
California Congressman Ron Dellums reintroduced the Professional
Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1983 on January 30, 1985.84 The
bill's coverage is extremely broad and would apply to all professional
baseball, football, basketball, hockey, and soccer teams85 intending to
relocate "from a stadium in the United States to a stadium outside the
city or county in which such franchise is operating. ' 86 The bill resembles
Senator Specter's proposal87 in that it allows team relocations in only
three per se situations: 1) when the stadium operator has materially
breached the teams's lease; 2) when the stadium is inadequate; or
3) when the team has incurred a net loss for three consecutive years.
88
Unlike Senator Specter's bill, however, extraordinary losses in less than
three years would not justify a relocation.
Even if one of the three criteria were met and the relocation were
therefore lawful, the bill provides a right of first refusal to the home mu-
nicipality. If the team is for sale, the local government authority may
acquire ownership by matching a bona fide outside offer. If, however, the
owner is merely seeking to relocate the team, it may be purchased at its
fair market value. The local government is given one year after being
notified of the team's intention to move in which to file suit to challenge
the propriety of the move or to purchase the team.8 9
Although the bill's right of first refusal extends to nonsale transfers
as well as sales and thereby closes the loophole present in the proposals
of Senators Boschwitz 90 and Specter, 91 this approach seems to be an un-
duly expensive solution to the relocation problem. The bill leaves the
entire burden of restricting franchise transfers on the affected cities
rather than allowing the particular league to police its own members, and
few local governments would have the necessary surplus capital to
purchase a major league team. In addition, the bill's broad terms would
apparently bar relocations by teams in infant leagues such as the United
States Football League and the Continental Basketball Association, in
which movement and merger may be necessary for survival, at least for a
84. H.R. 785, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Congressman Dellums, whose district in-
cludes Oakland, originally introduced this bill on Sept. 21, 1983, in response to the Raiders'
move to Los Angeles. See H.R. 3944, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
85. H.R. 785, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(2) (1985). The bill apparently considers neither
the length of time a team has resided in a particular area nor the age of the league.
86. Id. § 4(a).
87. S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. RIc. S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985); see supra
notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
88. H.R. 785, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(c) (1985).
89. Id. §§ 4-5.
90. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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start-up period. 92 Shifts within metropolitan areas but across city or
county lines would also appear to be prohibited.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Congressman Dellums' pro-
posal is that it is retroactive and would cover all franchise relocations
occurring after January 1, 1979. A team that moved during or after 1979
but before the bill's enactment would be required to return to its prior
location during court proceedings instituted by the local government un-
less a final antitrust judgment had been entered in the team's favor and
was not appealable, or unless a settlement had otherwise been reached.
93
While the Professional Sports Relocation Act properly encompasses all
major professional team sports, the relief provided is unduly harsh and
likely would be ineffective. Finally, like Senator Specter's bill, this bill
lacks sufficient objective criteria by which to make a relocation decision
and the forced-sale provision might be functionally unavailable in most
cases.
Sports Community Protection and Stability Act
On January 24, 1985, Arizona Senator Dennis DeConcini intro-
duced the Sports Community Protection and Stability Act.94 He stated
that the bill was intended to "protect communities and fans from arbi-
trary and unilateral decisions by owners." 95 The bill would apply to pro-
fessional basketball, football, hockey, and soccer leagues 96 and would
grant antitrust protection for league decisions refusing to allow a
franchise shift.97 Senator DeConcini made it clear that "this provision is
a one-way street. It does not immunize from antitrust laws league deci-
92. Cf S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (bill
applies only to professional football teams that have played in current city for past six years);
S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (bill applies only to sports leagues in operation more than
seven years).
93. H.R. 785, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1985).
94. S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. Rc. S682 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985). The city
of Phoenix was rumored to be the new home of the NFL's Philadelphia Eagles and St. Louis
Cardinals. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
95. 131 CONG. Rnc. S682 (daily ed. Jan 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
96. S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6, 131 CONG. Rc. S682-83 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
97. The bill provides in part:
(1) it shall not be unlawful by reason of any provision of the antitrust laws for
a professional team sports league and its member clubs-
(a) to enforce rules or agreements authorizing the membership of the league to
decide that a member club of such league shall not be relocated from its league-
franchised home area provided that nothing in this subsection shall otherwise affect
the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to any action instituted by a
municipality or other public authority challenging the relocation of a club from its
league-franchised home area ....
Id. § 2(l)(a). The section also provides an exemption for league revenue-sharing agreements.
Id. § 2(l)(b).
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sions to relocate franchises. The bill only permits leagues to act to pro-
tect the interests of fans and their home-area communities."98 In
contrast to the proposals by Senators Boschwitz and Specter and Con-
gressman Dellums, which do not give any independent legal validity to
league decisions, Senator DeConcini's bill would grant the leagues com-
plete discretion in determining the propriety of a relocation request and
would not require consideration of any specific objective criteria. 99
The twin rationales behind this bill are hopelessly contradictory.
On one hand, Senator DeConcini proposes to protect communities from
team owners' arbitrary relocation decisions by vesting full discretionary
power in the leagues. On the other hand, however, his bill grants anti-
trust immunity only if the league decides not to allow the move. Because
the bill contains no guidelines to govern league discretion, the leagues
would be free to be completely arbitrary as long as they reject the pro-
posed transfer. This power to exercise business judgment under the bill
is illusory. A league that granted a team permission to relocate would
risk antitrust liability in a suit brought by a municipality or other public
authorityl°°-a scenario expressly contemplated in the bill. 10 1 This
"one-way street" could render a franchise's current location a dead end
by prohibiting movement regardless of inadequate facilities, financial
losses, and fan disloyalty.
The Sports Community Protection and Stability Act thus goes too
far in attempting to protect the interests of cities and fans. It represents
an ironclad rule that franchises could not be moved without league ap-
proval, regardless of any circumstances justifying such a move.
Professional Sports Team Community Protection Act
Washington Senator Slade Gorton introduced the Professional
Sports Team Community Protection Act on January 24, 1985.102 This
bill would apply to professional baseball, football, basketball, and hockey
98. 131 CONG. REc. S682 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
99. Sen. DeConcini stated that placing the relocation issue under league control would
result in decisions "based on sound long-term business criteria." Id. at S683 (statement of Sen.
DeConcini).
100. The definition of "person" or "persons" for the purposes of the antitrust laws clearly
includes cities, whether as plaintiffs or defendants. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389, 394-97 (1978).
101. S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(l)(a)-(2), 131 CONG. Rlc. S683 (daily ed. Jan. 24,
1985). Presumably to avoid "hometown" jury bias, such a suit could be brought only in a
"neutral" United States District Court--one that was neither in the district where the team
was currently located nor where it planned to move. Id. § 2(2).
102. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S663 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985). Sen.
Gorton was Attorney General of the State of Washington in 1970 when the Seattle Pilots, an
American League baseball expansion team, moved to Milwaukee after only one year in Seattle.
131 CONG. Rnc. S663-64 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
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leagues. 10 3 Apart from an extensive relocation restriction and expansion
provision discussed below, the twenty-seven-page bill includes sections
concerning league-wide televison agreements and team access to publicly
owned or operated sports facilities. 10 4
The bill sets forth a two-tiered approach to proposed relocations.
First, the bill would prohibit transfers unless the governing league deter-
mines that the move is "necessary and appropriate," and approval is also
granted by a Professional Sports Franchise Arbitration Board. 10 5 In
making this determination, the league would be required to consider nine
objective factors, including: stadium adequacy; past fan support; public
financial support, including the construction of facilities; net operating
losses; and the degree to which the team has negotiated in good faith
with local officials regarding the current situation. If the league did not
find the relocation "necessary and appropriate," it would be
prohibited. 106
If the league approves the move, the bill's second tier requires the
formation of a three-member ad hoe arbitration board to conduct formal
hearings and consider, de novo, the same objective factors. A board rul-
ing that the transfer was not "necessary and appropriate" would end the
question; however, board approval would result in further consideration
of any "offers of retention." 10 7 If the board determined that any offer of
retention "is equal to or greater in value than the offer associated with
the proposed relocation, then there could be no relocation." 10 The bill
provides for judicial review only on the issue of whether the relevant
league or the board specifically considered the objective criteria.109
The bill's most controversial provision requires expansion by Major
League Baseball and the NFL. 10 Baseball would be required to add two
teams by 1988 and the NFL four by 1990, specifically including teams in
Baltimore and Oakland. 1 Senator Gorton argued that forced expansion
is essential to solving the franchise relocation problem: "The phenome-
non we have observed in the past few years has more [to] do with a fail-
103. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 110, 131 CONG. REc. S667 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
104. Id. §§ 201-202.
105. Id. §§ 104(a), 106, 131 CONG. REc. S666. The board would be comprised of one
member chosen by the relevant league, one by the community, and one by the President of the
American Arbitration Association. Id. § 106(b).
106. Id. §§ 104(b), 106(a)(2).
107. An "offer of retention" is "a statement of intention to purchase such team and to
continue thereafter to locate the team in the same community or to provide terms not involv-
ing a transfer of ownership which are more favorable to such team than the terms currently in
effect." Id. § 107(b)(2)(C).
108. 131 CONG. REC. S663-64 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
109. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 108, 131 CONG. REC. S667 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
110. Id. § 303(a), 131 CONG. REC. S668.
111. Id.
RAIDERS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ure of supply to meet the demand than it does with fickle owners."' 1 2 As
might be expected, sports league commissioners and congressional pro-
ponents of other relocation bills have roundly criticized this provision.'
13
Although this proposal takes many objective criteria into considera-
tion, it is nevertheless overly complicated and intrusive. The bill's two-,
and possibly three-level approach is unnecessary and completely under-
mines the league self-determination it purports to respect. While provid-
ing a number of tasks for the arbitration board, the bill does not explain
how the potentially complicated "offers of retention" are to be measured.
Further, instead of expressly providing an antitrust exemption for deter-
minations made pursuant to the bill, Senator Gorton simply concludes
that a league will "[not] be subjected to substantial damage awards
against it if it has proceeded in accordance with the act.""
4
Senator Gorton presumably means that action taken after consider-
ation of the objective criteria would automatically pass "rule of reason"
scrutiny. However, because of the number of factors involved in the
"rule of reason" analysis 1 5 and the hesitancy of courts to imply antitrust
exemptions, 116 a league attempting to act lawfully under the bill could
still be found in violation of the Sherman Act.
The Professional Sports Team Community Protection Act, like each
of the other proposals discussed, fails to properly balance the needs of all
interested parties. While the interests of the affected cities and fans
should be of utmost coficern, the relevant league should also be a party to
the decision. However, Senator Gorton's arbitration board proposal
could invalidate league determinations that a relocation would be "neces-
sary and appropriate."
Only one bill that has been introduced in Congress properly blends
all of the necessary elements of a franchise relocation regulatory
scheme-namely, protection of community, fan, and league interests
while avoiding excessive governmental intrusion. This bill is the Profes-
sional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985.
The Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985
While testifying before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation in February 1985, Missouri Senator Thomas
112. Hearings, supra note 32, at 4 (statement of Sen. Gorton).
113. See infra notes 141-50.
114. 131 CONG. REC. S664-65 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
115. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
116. E.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1974) ("Im-
plied antitrust immunity is not favored. .. ."); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,




F. Eagleton set forth the alternatives available in considering federal leg-
islation to restrict professional sports franchise relocations:
Congress I think has before it some choices. It can endure the
status quo, leaving many cities thus completely vulnerable; Congress
can overreact by hamstringing the leagues and by setting itself up as
some kind of sports czar; or Congress can devise fair guidelines that
recognize the leagues' right to operate like a business, but with an ac-
companying obligation to ensure stability and fairness between sports
teams and their communities.
117
Senator Eagleton and cosponsor Senator John C. Danforth of Mis-
souri attempted to pursue the latter alternative by introducing the Pro-
fessional Sports Community Protection Act ("Protection Act") on
January 22, 1985.118 The Protection Act would provide a limited anti-
trust exemption for sports leagues that follow specific enumerated objec-
tive criteria in reviewing a franchise relocation request. The bill's
purpose is to allow league independence while providing a check on the
raiding of sports teams by cities, without creating a situation in which
"any transfer of a franchise is a matter that some Government agency
involves itself in."119
Coverage under the Protection Act would be limited to professional
basketball, football, hockey, and soccer leagues that have been in opera-
tion for more than seven years. 120 A limited antitrust exemption is pro-
vided in section 4 of the bill, which states: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, it is lawful for a professional sports league or its mem-
ber clubs.., to enforce rules or agreements authorizing the membership
of such league to decide whether a member club may change its home
territory." 121 A team requesting permission to move must provide writ-
ten notice to the league, its current stadium operator, and the affected
local government at least six months prior to the start of the season in
which the team plans to play in its new location.
1 22
The Protection Act would require the league to conduct proceedings
117. Hearings, supra note 32, at 47 (testimony of Sen. Eagleton).
118. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The combined efforts of the Missouri senators
are not surprising considering the recent attempted move of the NHL's St. Louis Blues to
Saskatchewan, the transfer of the NBA's Kansas City Kings to Sacramento, and the rumors
surrounding the NFL's St. Louis Cardinals. See supra notes 32-36, 38-39 & 44-46 and accom-
panying text.
119. Hearings, supra note 32, at 1-2 (opening statement of Sen. Danforth).
120. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(6)-(7) (1985). Fledgling sports leagues such as the
United States Football League and the Continental Basketball Association would not be cov-
ered by the Protection Act. Major League Baseball, which is exempt from the antitrust laws,
see supra note 48, also would not be covered.
121. S. 259, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4(a)(1) (1985). The Protection Act also provides an
exemption for league revenue-sharing agreements, id. § 4(a)(2), and establishes procedures and
standards for team ownership, including the termination of ownership, as long as such rules
are nondiscriminatory and are adopted by three-fourths of the member clubs. Id. § 4(a)(3)-(4).
122. Id. § 5(a)-(b).
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within two months of receipt of notice in which all interested parties,
including the team requesting the move, are given an opportunity to
present testimony. 123 A relocation would be permitted only if the league
determined that it was "reasonable and appropriate." 124 In making this
determination, the league would be required to consider and make spe-
cific findings regarding:
(1) the comparative adequacy of the team's current stadium or
arena;
(2) the comparative adequacy of facilities related to the stadium
or arena, including transportation, vending, or retail facilities;
(3) the desire or ability of the stadium or arena operator or local
government to remedy any inadequacies in the facility, or to provide
other arrangements or incentives to make it reasonable and appropri-
ate for the team to remain in the area;
(4) the extent to which the team has directly or indirectly re-
ceived public financial support through facilities construction or spe-
cial tax treatment, and the extent to which debt on such support
remains outstanding;
(5) the effects of the relocation on any contract or agreement
entered into by the team;
(6) the extent to which the team's ownership or management
has contributed to any circumstance that might demonstrate that relo-
cation is necessary;
(7) the comparative operating revenue in the previous three
seasons;
(8) any net operating losses by the team in the previous three
seasons;
(9) team fan support, demonstrated by attendance, ticket sales,
or other factors;
(10) the number of professional and college teams playing the
same sport in the current and proposed locations;
(11) any bona fide offer to purchase the team at fair market
value and keep it in the same location;
(12) the extent to which the team has engaged in good faith
negotiations aimed at keeping the team in its current stadium or arena
or another facility in the area.125
The bill provides for limited judicial review of league relocation de-
cisions in federal court. The team wishing to move, the local govern-
ment, or the stadium authority in either the present or proposed location
could bring a civil action within thirty days of a league determination.
However, such an action could be fied only in a "neutral" district-that
is, one outside the state or states that contain the present and proposed
home territory. 126 If interested parties were denied the opportunity to
123. Id. § 5(c).
124. Id. § 6(a)(2).
125. Id. § 6(b).
126. Id. § 7(a)-(b). The district court could set aside a league determination only if it
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present testimony, the district court would be empowered to order a new
hearing and to require the league to reconsider its decision.
127
The bill's antitrust exemptions are not self-executing. A league de-
siring to enforce a relocation agreement made pursuant to section 4
would be required to adopt its own rule conforming to the hearing and
objective criteria provisions and file this rule with the Secretary of Com-
merce.' 28 Moreover, the exemptions are limited: the Protection Act ex-
pressly preserves the applicability of antitrust and labor laws to the
wages, hours, conditions of employment, and collective bargaining rights
of professional athletes. State and local laws relating to sports teams or
leagues and stadium lease agreements that are consistent with the provi-
sions of the bill also would be unaffected. 2 9
The Senate committee added section 9 to the Protection Act in re-
sponse to concerns regarding expansion. That section requires sports
leagues covered by the bill to "formulate and adopt a suitable policy...
setting forth the criteria and standards it will employ in determining
whether and when future expansions of such league will occur, and the
number of member clubs which may be added by any such
expansions."130
The Protection Act provides an excellent solution to the sports
franchise relocation problem and appears superior to the proposals ana-
lyzed above. It grants the ultimate decision-making power to the rele-
vant league, which is likely to be less self-interested than the affected city
and is better qualified to make business judgments regarding league
structure than the courts or a quasi-legislative agency. Further, the Pro-
tection Act strikes a preferable compromise not found in the other pro-
posals. A collective, informed determination by the entire league
membership is given the respect it deserves.
Despite this grant of discretionary authority, leagues are prevented
from acting in an arbitrary or subjective manner. Their decisions must
encompass criteria that consider diverse interests. A franchise owner
should be guaranteed the right to operate a successful, popular, profit-
making team in a favorable environment. At the same time, communities
need to protect both their long-term investments and their receipt of
franchise revenues. Finally, the interests of fans-the group usually least
represented in relocation matters-should be recognized. By considering
found the determination was "not supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a
whole, or was obtained by corruption, fraud or undue means." Id. § 7(c).
127. Id. § 7(d).
128. Id. § 8(a)(1). The league would evidently be free to determine the majority required
in its voting procedure.
129. Id. §§9-11.
130. Id. § 9. Such a policy statement would be required within one year after the Protec-
tion Act became applicable to a particular league and would be published in the Federal Regis-
ter. Id.
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these interests, the Protection Act balances the needs of the concerned
parties without resorting to intrusive governmental involvement.
In a statement prepared for hearings before the Senate committee
considering the Eagleton-Danforth proposal, NFL Commissioner Ro-
zelle said that the fundamental approach of any relocation legislation
should be to "deal directly with the source of the problem, the status of
sports leagues under the antitrust laws; clarify that status; and do so in
narrow, well-defined ways." 131 By granting a limited antitrust exemp-
tion, the Protection Act gives its blessing to sports league self-determina-
tion. Discretion is limited, but the overall theme is to return to the
leagues the power they possessed before Raiders. This authority is
neither undermined by a second-tier review board132 nor superseded by a
municipality's right of first refusal.
133
The Protection Act attempts to ensure a truly reasonable outcome
by requiring league investigations to reach specific findings on twelve ob-
jective factors.134 Some criteria in the bill-stadium adequacy, breach of
stadium lease, and recent net operating losses-are common in relocation
proposals. 35 In addition to these criteria, however, the Protection Act
requires examination of the adequacy of facilities adjacent to the sta-
dium and of operating revenue in relation to other league members. The
physical condition of a stadium, including its seating capacity, is of ut-
most importance to a successful sports team. So too are adjacent high-
ways, public transportation facilities, parking lots, and adequate security.
Although teams should not be allowed to relocate solely to reap higher
profits to the detriment of cities and fans, comparative revenues short of
actual losses are relevant to a relocation request.
The Protection Act also requires leagues to consider any offers to
purchase a team without relocating it. While such offers do not create a
right of first refusal in the offeror or the affected city, they are to be
considered in determining whether a transfer should be approved.
36
Findings are also required on unique factors involving community inter-
ests: direct and indirect public support including the construction of sta-
diums, fan support, contracts with public or private parties, and good
131. Hearings, supra note 32, at 64 (statement of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, NFL).
132. See S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S663 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985)
(creates ad hoc arbitration board).
133. See S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S282 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985); H.R.
785, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 2050, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S15,383
(daily ed. Nov. 3, 1983) (all provide a right of first refusal for affected community).
134. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
135. See S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S663, S666 (daily ed. Jan. 24,
1985); S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S282 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985); H.R. 785,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (all provide listed criteria).
136. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(11) (1985).
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faith negotiations to keep the team in place.1 37 According to Senator
Eagleton, "these criteria are designed to ensure that if a team is well
supported by and is succeeding in a given community it would be pre-
cluded from moving."
138
These safeguards, however, would not "lock in" teams to their cur-
rent locations. League approval of a "reasonable and appropriate" trans-
fer is shielded from antitrust liability. This "two-way street" provision
ensures that the league's decision-making power is not illusory. Senator
Eagleton admitted that, although a move by the St. Louis football
Cardinals might not be allowed by the NFL under his bill, the Kansas
City Kings' anticipated transfer to Sacramento perhaps would be ap-
proved by the NBA.
139
The Protection Act's "reasonable and appropriate" standard, while
lower than the "necessary and appropriate" finding required by Senator
Gorton's bill, seems sufficient. Showing literal "necessity" in a given case
could be extremely difficult, even for a team that is losing money. Own-
ers may be expected to act conservatively, regardless of regulatory meas-
ures, because of the natural belief that relocations cause local animosity
and contribute to league instability.
The Protection Act's theme of league deference and impartial deter-
mination of relocation requests is further illustrated by its judicial review
provision. Senator Eagleton said that allowing a suit to be brought in an
"interested" federal district court could undermine the entire proposal:
"From past experience, it is clear that neither the community trying to
retain the team, nor the city luring one can provide an objective forum
for evaluating a league relocation decision on the merits, for it may [be]
set aside ... if it is not supported by substantial evidence. . .. "140
Two things are noticeably absent from the Protection Act. First, it
does not provide a blanket antitrust exemption, but rather maintains
team and league liability for unlawful conduct regarding player relations,
negotiations, and contracts. Second, and more importantly, the Protec-
tion Act does not require expansion. The mandatory expansion ap-
proach of Senator Gorton's bill 141 was criticized by the commissioners of
137. Senator Gorton's bill also includes "community interest" factors. S. 287, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 104(b), 131 CONG. REC. 5663, S666 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
138. Hearings, supra note 32, at 47 (statement of Sen. Eagleton).
139. Id. at 49. The NBA eventually did approve the Kings' transfer. See supra notes 38-
39 and accompanying text.
140. Hearings, supra note 32, at 48 (statement of Sen. Eagleton). One of the issues on
appeal in Raiders was the district court's refusal to grant the NFL's request for a change of
venue. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1399-1401 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
141. S. 287, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. § 303(a), 131 CONG. REC. S663, S668 (daily ed. Jan. 24,
1985); see supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
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the NFL,142 the NBA,143 and Major League Baseball,144 as well as by
sports officials of some cities that would be the most likely to benefit from
it. 145 Senator DeConcini, who was the sponsor of a relocation bill previ-
ously discussed, 146 accurately stated that Senator Gorton's "call for
forced ... expansion represents an unwarranted Congressional fiat. Con-
gress should not be in the business of selecting cities... [but] should
create a legal climate in which leagues can follow their best business
judgment."147
Senator Eagleton said that forced expansion was not included in the
Protection Act because it is a "heavyhanded and intrusive" proposition
and Congress is ill-suited "to make that kind of an arbitrary, precise
judgment."' 4 He concluded that voluntary expansion by the leagues
would result from the stability provided by the bill's various provisions,
including relocation restrictions, authorization of revenue sharing, and
procedures and standards for team ownership. 49 The Senator added:
"It is not a question of the record being expansionless. They have ex-
panded at various times when they thought it was wise and propitious
and there was market justification for so doing."'150 A section requiring
sports leagues covered by the Protection Act to formulate, adopt, and
publish specific expansion plans and guidelines was added to the bill in
committee.' 51 However, the senators wisely recognized that forced ex-
pansion was not a necessary quid pro quo for federal relocation
legislation.
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
conducted hearings on the Protection Act on February 4 and 20, 1985.
Witnesses included officials of professional sports leagues and players'
142. "Legislation forcing expansion on the NFL is... unwarranted and unsupportable
both legally and practically." Hearings, supra note 32, at 69 (statement of Pete Rozelle, Com-
missioner, NFL).
143. "[S]imply to announce expansion without regard to the underlying business justifica-
tions or considerations would be foolhardy. . . ." Id. at 78 (testimony of David J. Stem,
Commissioner, NBA).
144. "Such a mandate for expansion could lead to the very sort of financial and other
problems that ultimately cause a club to seek to relocate." Id. at 57 (statement of Peter Ueber-
roth, Commissioner, Major League Baseball).
145. Although Sen. Gorton's bill would guarantee Oakland an NFL expansion franchise
by 1990, Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Commission President George VuKasin testified
that he would rather not have a team legislatively imposed on the city. Id. at 158-60 (testi-
mony of George VuKasin). Steve Katich, Executive Director of the Denver Baseball Commis-
sion, stated that forced expansion is, "from a public policy perspective, improper. It could, in
fact, ultimately prove to be counter-productive. . . ." Id. at 153 (statement of Steve Katich).
146. S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S682 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
147. Hearings, supra note 32, at 165 (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
148. Id. at 48-49 (testimony of Sen. Eagleton).
149. See supra note 121.
150. Hearings, supra note 32, at 51 (testimony of Sen. Eagleton).
151. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1985).
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associations, congressmen, mayors, governors, and stadium representa-
tives. The committee approved the Protection Act on April 2, 1985, and
referred it to the Senate Judiciary Committee. That committee held
hearings on June 12, 1985, but the bill was discharged after it was not
acted upon in forty-five days. On July 8, 1985, the Protection Act was
placed on the general Senate Legislative Calendar and was scheduled for
consideration on the Senate floor in early December 1985.
The bill never reached the Senate floor. Although Senate Majority
Leader Robert Dole had designated two days for consideration of the
bill, his efforts were blocked when Senators Albert Gore, Jr., of Tennes-
see and Charles Mathias of Maryland threatened a filibuster. Gore and
Mathias reportedly demanded mandatory NFL expansion in exchange
for releasing the bill.152 The first session of the 99th Congress thus ad-
journed without the Senate's passage of the Protection Act.
Suggested Improvements for the Professional Sports Community
Protection Act
Although the Protection Act's current form is an effective answer to
the sports franchise relocation problem and is superior to the other pro-
posals discussed above, some improvements can be made. I suggest four
revisions here: 1) expressly providing that the Protection Act override
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act; 2) lengthening the notice period
required for teams desiring to relocate; 3) including Major League Base-
ball in the bill's coverage; and 4) expressly stating the effect of this legis-
lation on suits brought by cities attempting to acquire teams by eminent
domain.
The core of the Protection Act is its limited antitrust exemption for
sports league decisions regarding franchise relocation requests. Section 4
of the Act begins with the sweeping phrase, "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law . . ,,153 Although antitrust immunity is clearly in-
tended,154 adding the phrase "including but not limited to sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act" would leave no room for interpretation. Such
specific language is found in the proposals of Senators Boschwitz, 155
Specter, 156 and DeConcini, 157 and should be written into the Protection
Act.
152. NFL Franchise Bill Killed,' St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 4; see
131 CONG. Rtc. S17,217 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1985).
153. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1985).
154. See Hearings, supra note 32, at 47 (testimony of Sen. Eagleton) ("Leagues would be
insulated from antitrust conspiracy liability .... ").
155. S. 2050, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a), 129 CONG. REC. S15,384 (daily ed. Nov. 3,
1983).
156. S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, 131 CONG. R~c. S285 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985).
157. S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(1), 131 CONG. Rac. 8683 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
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The Protection Act currently requires a team wishing to move to
provide at least six months' written notice before the beginning of the
season in which it plans to play in its new location. 158 This period is
insufficient. If the relevant league takes the maximum three months al-
lowed to make its decision, 159 only three months would remain before the
start of the target season. A suit to review league action could be initi-
ated as late as thirty days later160-leaving only two months before the
season. Such a short time frame, even assuming immediate district court
review, could cause problems in game schedules, stadium reservations,
and team travel arrangements. Therefore, it would be better to increase
the required notice period to at least nine months or one year before the
start of the target season.
Senator Eagleton did not include Major League Baseball in the Pro-
tection Act because "the Supreme Court consistently has recognized
baseball as a unique entity and has allowed it to regulate itself. ' 161 Pre-
sumably, the Senator reasoned that, since baseball is exempt from anti-
trust liability,162 its status was not altered by the Raiders decision. While
baseball does not need an antitrust exemption to control franchise move-
ment, legislative regulation would ensure that its relocation decisions are
not arbitrary or subjective. There should be no less deference to league
relocation determination for baseball than for any other sport, but
neither should the objective standards on which those determinations are
based be lower. Cities with baseball teams deserve the same procedural
protections as do those with football, basketball, hockey, or soccer
franchises. Without imposing similar requirements, there is no guarantee
that unreasonable transfers will be blocked or that reasonable moves will
be allowed to proceed. Interestingly, before the recent NFL and NBA
developments, many of the most controversial sports franchise moves
met with Major League Baseball owners' approval-the Brooklyn Dodg-
ers to Los Angeles and the New York Giants to San Francisco in 1958,
the Milwaukee Braves to Atlanta in 1966, the Seattle Pilots to Milwau-
kee in 1970, and the Washington Senators to Dallas-Fort Worth in
1971.163 Baseball should be included in the Protection Act to ensure that
all affected parties-including fans and the local community-are given
a chance to be heard and to have their interests considered. Because the
bill's antitrust exemption is not self-executing, 164 mandatory language in
the bill including baseball would be necessary.
158. S. 259, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. § 5(a) (1985).
159. Id. § 5(c).
160. Id. § 7(b)(1).
161. Hearings, supra note 32, at 48 (testimony of Sen. Eagleton).
162. See supra note 48.
163. Hearings, supra note 32, at 142 (testimony of Donald M. Fehr, Executive Director,
Major League Baseball Players Association).
164. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Protection Act does not explicitly state the effect it
would have on eminent domain suits filed by communities attempting to
"take" their sports franchises.1 65 Such suits by the cities of Oakland and
Baltimore have not yet been successful,1 66 but they remain legally possi-
ble. Eminent domain suits could either be expressly preempted by the
Protection Act through the Commerce Clause, 167 or be allowed to com-
plement the policies and provisions of the legislation by providing a mu-
nicipality with an alternative-albeit drastic-means of retaining the
team. Commentators have debated the propriety and constitutionality of
such efforts, 168 and the Protection Act should provide courts with spe-
cific guidance on the preemption issue.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' 1984 decision in the Raiders
antitrust case effectively invalidated professional sports leagues' estab-
165. The City of Oakland is attempting to use its condemnation power to reclaim the
Raiders. In City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr.
673 (1982), the California Supreme Court held that a city can acquire a sports franchise by
eminent domain if it can demonstrate a valid public use. The decision did not involve the
merits of the city's attempt, but reversed a trial court's granting of the Raiders' motion for
summary judgment and remanded for trial.
166. In City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153
(1985), a California court of appeal affirmed a judgment against the city in its suit to acquire
the team by eminent domain. The appellate court held that such an acquisition would imper-
missibly burden interstate commerce. "This is the precise brand of parochial meddling with
the national economy that the commerce clause was designed to prohibit." Id. at 421, 220 Cal.
Rptr. at 157. The court of appeal denied a petition for rehearing, and the California Supreme
Court refused to review the case. The city was expected to appeal the decision to the United
States Supreme Court. Oakland Takes Up Battle Again, Long Beach (Cal.) Press-Telegram,
May 31, 1986, at E6, col. 3.
The City of Baltimore's effort to reacquire the Colts ended when a federal district court
granted the team's summary judgment motion. The Colts had already physically moved their
offices by the time the suit was filed and were held to be no longer subject to the City's condem-
nation power. Mayor of Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp 278 (D. Md.
1985).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
168. See Note, Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are There Limits After Oakland Raiders
and Poletown, 20 CAL. W.L. REv. 82 (1983); Comment, Taking the Oakland Raiders: .4
Theoretical Reconsideration of the Concepts of Public Use and Just Compensation, 32 EMORY
L.J. 857 (1983); Note, The Constitutionality of Taking a Sports Franchise by Eminent Domain
and the Need for Federal Legislation to Restrict Franchise Relocation, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
553 (1985); Comment, Eminent Domain: Condemnation of Professional Football Franchises
and the Commerce Clause Defense, 28 How. L.J. 773 (1985); Note, Jurisdictional Limitations
on Intangible Property in Eminent Domain: Focus on the Indianapolis Colts, 60 IND. L.J. 389
(1985); Comment, Eminent Domain Exercised-Stare Decisis or a Warning: City of Oakland
v. Oakland Raiders, 4 PACE L. Rav. 169 (1983); Comment, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raid-
ers: Defining the Parameters of Limitless Power, 1983 UTAH L. Rv. 397 (1983); Comment,
California Eminent Domain Statute Allows the Taking ofAny Type of Property Interests-City
of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 6 WHrrriER L. REv. 135 (1984).
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lished practice of regulating relocation of their member clubs. Following
the decision, three teams, one from the NFL and two from the NBA,
moved to different cities and others attempted or threatened to move.
The leagues and local governments, following a suggestion of the
Raiders court, have sought federal legislation to regulate franchise moves
and end the trend of cities bidding for teams. Justifications for such legis-
lation include the protection of municipal financial investments, reten-
tion of the local revenue generated by the franchises, the need for
stability in professional sports teams and leagues, and the intangible civic
pride engendered by a sports franchise.
Bills introduced in Congress since 1983 have approached the reloca-
tion problem in various ways. Proposed solutions include rights of first
refusal for affected cities, governmental review boards to evaluate and
approve proposed moves, and limited antitrust exemptions for profes-
sional sports leagues. I have examined six such Congressional proposals
and have concluded that the Professional Sports Community Protection
Act of 1985, cosponsored by Missouri Senators Eagleton and Danforth,
offers the best solution.
The Protection Act would provide an antitrust exemption to foot-
ball, basketball, hockey, and soccer leagues that adopt and apply
franchise relocation rules requiring formal hearings and consideration of
specific objective criteria in the process of approving or disapproving a
relocation request. These criteria include the adequacy of the team's
physical facilities, its net operating revenues in relation to other league
members, the extent to which the team has received public financial sup-
port, fan interest, the number of other teams playing the same sport in
the current and proposed locations, bona fide purchase offers by local
buyers, and the extent to which the team has negotiated in good faith to
prevent relocation. This bill is superior to the other proposals examined
because it grants the ultimate decision-making power regarding reloca-
tions to the individual leagues-the authorities best suited to make such
decisions-while considering and balancing the needs of all the parties.
Finally, this bill does not require league expansion.
Some changes, however, would improve the bill. The notice period
required for teams desiring to move should be increased from six months
to at least nine months or one year. In addition, Major League Baseball,
which is exempt from the antitrust laws, should be included in the bill's
coverage to ensure that its relocation decisions reflect the same objective
criteria required of other sports leagues. Finally, the bill should ex-
pressly state its potential effect on "team-taking" eminent domain suits.
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With these improvements, the Professional Sports Community Protec-
tion Act should be approved by Congress and signed into law.
Daniel S. York*
* Member, Third Year Class
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